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tinuing or recurring nuisance, however trivial, provided only it is suf-
ficient to sustain an action at law for damages, will support an in-
junction.3 '
In conclusion, as to the liability of a defendant in an action for
damages for blasting, recovery may be had: (1) where dirt, stones and
other debris are thrown by the blast upon adjoining property, irre-
spective of the question of negligence; (2) where the work of blasting
is done in (a) a situation or location where it is necessarily danger-
ous to persons or property, the negligence arising in attempting to
blast at all; and (b) in all other cases where the work itself has been
megligently done.32
JOAN A. EVANS.
CONTRACTS-SUIT BY SUBCONTRACTOR ON CONTRACT
'EXECUTED BY CONTRACTOR WITH OWNER.
The Jackson Lumber Company had a contract with the Board of
.Education of Lexington to construct a high school building. The
'lumber company sublet the steel work to the Huntington Iron Works
Company and the Union Transfer Company transported certain ma-
terials for the Huntington Company. This action was brought by the
lumber company against the school board to recover the balance due
on the original contract. The defendant asked that other claimants
'be made parties to the action. The Transfer Company came in as
-one of such parties and claimed the fund on the ground that it was held
'by the school board In trust for their use. Held: For Transfer Com-
pany.'
Quoting provisions from the contract in question, "Unless other-
'wise stipulated, the contractor shall provide and pay for materials, etc.-
used in the execution of work.-The contractor to indemnify and save
harmless the Board from all suits-and should guarantee the prompt
payment of all persons furnishing material and labor to said con-
tractor.-Final payment of the retained sum will not be made until
'the contractor should deliver to the Board a release of all liens arising
out of the contract."
2
The court reasoned thus, "a contract may inure to the benefit of
a third party depending upon whether the third person is a party to
the consideration, or the contract was entered into for his benefit, or
11 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 2d Ed., Vol. 5, p. 4383; Whit-
field v. Rogers, 26 Mass. (4 Cush.) 84 (1853); Luxo v. Higgin, 69 Cal.
256, 10 Pac. 674 (1886); Corning & Winslow v. Troy Iroquois Factory,
40 N. Y. 191 (1869); Harper, Etc., Co. v. Mountain, Etc., Co., 208 Pa. St.
.540, 57 Atl. 1055 (1904).
32 Lowden v. City of Cincinnati, note 16, supra.
IJ. T. Jackson Lumber Company v. Union Transfer & Storage
Cjompany, 246 Ky. 653, 55 S. W. (2d) 670 (1933).
2 Note 1, supra, at p. 654.
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he has some legal or equitable interest in its performance." The court-
further said, "there are two distinct lines of decision in this class of-
contracts: those between the contractor and the owner, 'If the bond,
when read in connection with the contract, contains a provision ob-
ligating the contractor to pay for the material, or to compensate the-
laborers, it constitutes a provision for the benefit of the laborers and
materialmen upon which they are entitled to maintain an action-
directly against the surety.'3 On the other hand, when the bond is one
solely to secure performance of the contract and contains no express:
provision for the benefit of third parties-an actioni thereon by a
stranger to the contract cannot be maintained-hence the problem be-.
comes the interpretation of the written instruments to ascertain.
whether they contain any provision for the bdnefit of the material-
men."' The court goes on to say that the terms of the contract are
specific "and evidence an intention on the part of the contractor to
see that all claims arising out of the building contract should be
satisfied."5 The "two lines of decision" above referred to are repre-
sented by the Federal Surety Company v. Commonwealth, and other
casesO which allow an action, and by the case of Dayton Lumber and-
Manufacturing Company v. New Capital Hotel, and others7 which deny-
the right of action.
There seems to be little difficulty in supporting these latter de--
cisions.
The Restatement of Contracts agrees and, in the following words,
would allow an action: "When the performance of a promise in a con-
tract will benefit a person other than the promisee, that is-a creditor-
beneficiary, if no purpose to make a gift appears in view of the accom-
panying circumstances and performance of the promise will satisfy an
actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary."'e
After this definition, the Restatement gives such a beneficiary a right:
of action in the following words, "a creditor beneficiary who has an
enforceable claim against the promisee can get judgment against-.
either promisee or promisor or against each of them."" A further
IQuoting from National Surety Company v. Daviess County Plan-
ing Mills Company, 213 Ky. 670, 281 S. W. 791 (1926).
'Principal case at p. 655.
Principal case at p. 656.
' Federal Union Surety Company v. Commonwealth, 139 Ky. 92, 129,
S. W. 335 (1910); Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland v. Charles
Hegerwald Company, 144 Ky. 790, 139 S. W. 975 (1911); Citizen Trust
Company v. Peebles Paving Brick Company, 174 Ky. 439, 192 S. W. 508.
(1917); National Surety Company v. Daviess County Planing Mills
Company, supra, n. 3; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v. Southern-
Surety Company, 225 Ky. 501, 9 S. IV. (2d) 229 (1928).
'Dayton Lumber & Manufacturing Company v. New Capital Hotel,-
222 Ky. 29, 299 S. W. 1093 (1928); Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 37 Fed. (2d) 279 (1930).
0 Sec. 133.
$Sec. 141.
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statement says, "It Is not essential to the creation of a right-that
he be identified-." 10
A statement from Consolidated Realty Company v. Richmond
Hotel d Building Company,' wherein the principal case is commented
upon with approval, gives an example of how such a right has come
to be looked upon, quoting: "the rule that a party for whose benefit
a contract is made may sue thereon, in his own name, although the
undertaking is not directly to or with him or in his own name, is
too well recognized to need authority or reason to sustain it." (Ed.
italics.) Again, in Blain d Franse Construction Company v. Allen,"
we find this statement, "We have gone over this subject so many times
that we will consume no time and space to further elaborate the
proposition involved or the reasons supporting it. '
Mr. Williston has this to say, "There seems no good reason why A
should not be able, for a consideration received from B, to make an
effective promise to C.""1
Some states deny the third party a right of action at law, but
nevertheless they allow him a right of action in equity by way of
subrogation."
The theory behind allowing this action by the third party is hard
to classify and rationalize. The courts have not bothered to name the
theory, but one Code state"6 has expressly declared the obligee a trus-
tee for the benefit of the third party. (Ed. italics.) However, the theory
"See. 139.
"253 Ky. 463, 69 S. W. (2d) 97 (1934).
=251 Ky. 366, 65 S. W. (2d) 78 (1933).
3Potts v. Gadsden First National Bank, 102 Ala. 268, 14 So. 633
'(1894); Talbot v. Wilkins, 31 Ark. 599 (1876); Tyler v. Mayer, 95
'Cal. 88, 30 Pac. 193 (1892); Grimes v. Baundollar, 58 Colo. 421, 148
Pac. 256 (1897); Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342 (1829); Hunter v.
Wilson, 21 Fla. 250 (1825); Searles v. Flova, 225 Ill. 167, 80 N. E. 769
(1907); Randell v. Moore, 153 Ind. 393, 53 N. E. 180 (1899); Luney v.
Mead, 60 Iowa 469, 15 N. W. 290 (1893); Strong v. Marcy, 33 Kan.
109, 5 Pac. 366 (1885); Millaudon v. Allard, 2 La. 547 (1893); Coffin
•v. Bradbury, 89 Me. 476, 36 A.t. 988 (1897); Small v. Schaefer, 24 Md.
143 (1865); Lovejoy v. Howe, 55 Minn. 353, 57 N. W. 57 (1897); Moore
v. Kirkland, 112 Miss. 55, 72 So. 855 (1916); Collier v. De Brigard, 80
N. J. L. 94, 77 Atl. 513 (1910); Clark v. Howard, 160 N. Y. 232, 44 N. E
695 (1896) ; Faust v. Faust, 144 N. C. 383, 57 S. E. 22 (1907) ; McDonald
v. Finseth, 32 N. D. 400, 155 N. W. 863 (1915); Emmit v. Brody, 42
Oh. St. 82 (1884); Stavens Carriage Co. v. Jones, 32 Okla. 713, 123
-Pac. 148 (1912); Baker v. Elgin, 11 Ore. 333, 8 Pac. 288 (1886); Water-
house v. Waterhouse, 29 R. I. 485, 72 Atl. 642 (1908); Timmons v.
Boyd, 89 S. C. 11, 73 S. E. 289 (1912); Ruohs v. Tradqrs Ins. Co., 111
Tenn. 405, 28 S. W. 85 (1904); Mathonican v. Scott, 87 Tex. 396, 28
S. W. 1063 (1895); Smith v. Bowan, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687 (1907);
Coleman v. Whitney, 62 Vt. 123, 20 Atl. 322 (1891); Casselman v.
,Gordon, 118 Va. 553, 88 S. E. 58 (1916); Hart v. Bogle, 88 Wash. 125,
152 Pac. 1010 (1915); Nutter v. Syndenstriker, 11 W. Va. 535 (1877);
Sedgwick v. Blanchard, 164 Wis. 421, 160 N. W. 267 (1917).
" Selections from Williston's Treatise on Contracts, See. 354.
26Palmer v. Brag, 136 Mich. 85, 98 N. W. 849 (1904); Crowell v,
XSt. Barnabus Hospital, 2? N. J. Eq. 659 (1876).
SMissouri Revised Statutes, See. 1990 (1891).
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of a trust seems hard to substantiate when one tries to point out the
trust res, except in some cases where the money is paid into the court
-as in the principal case. We venture to submit that the practice be
-called: a rule of convenience to avoid circuity of action. One court
has had this to say, "by following it (referring to-allowing the third
:party to sue) one action often effects the same result that two would
be required to accomplish without it."' But most courts are content
to consider the right as a matter of fact and let it go at that.
In conclusion, we submit that, generally speaking, the law is
,settled that a creditor beneficiary for whose implied benefit a con-
tract is made may sue thereon in his own name, and that the question
has ceased to be a question of law but merely a matter of construing
-the agreement of the parties.
FOREST J. NEEL.
INFANTS-RIGHT TO CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF INFANT.
The matter of custody of an infant child has long been a problem
-to the courts. This is true, not because of a great discrepancy in prior
-decisions upon the subject, but because succeeding generations have
recognized the weaknesses prevalent in the old system of laws on
Infants and have sought to better them. Courts have, as always, hesi-
,tated to branch out upon a new line of thought. They have clung
-tenaciously to the idea that the family, being the foundation of civiliza-
tion, should never be disturbed, and that the parent is the supreme
-ruler of the destinies of his children. The courts at early common law,
'ailed to recognize a right of control in the mother, but placed the
,entire matter in the hands of the father.' It has been quite a struggle
'for the courts even with the aid of statutes to avoid following this
rule. In the early cases, even where the father was leading a life of
-open- profligacy, he was given custody of his children. 2 Gradually
,considering the statutes and the discretionary power of the courts, it
'has come to be the rule that the welfare of the infant is the chief
consideration in controversies of this kind and courts will give the
-custody of the child to either father or mother and sometimes will
deny to both of them the custody of their children.' Neither father
'nor mother has any right that can be allowed to seriously militate
ugainst the welfare of the child. If the father be unfit to have the
-custody of his child the courts will promptly declare his rights for-
2T Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 279, at p. 671, 16 S. W. 198, at p. 199
(1891).
'People v. Mercein, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 399 (1842).
2 Ball v. Ball, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 54 (1851).
sPryse v. Thayer, 85 Ran. 566, 118 Pac. 56 (1911); Chance v.
P'gneguy, 212 Ky. 430, 279 S. W. 640 (1926); Moore v. Smith, 228 Ky.
286, 14 S. W. (2d) 1072 (1929).
